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ABSTRACT
Lockdown measures in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic involve placing huge burdens on some 
members of society for the sake of benefiting other 
members of society. How should we decide when these 
policies are permissible? Many writers propose we should 
address this question using cost- benefit analysis (CBA), 
a broadly consequentialist approach. We argue for an 
alternative non- consequentialist approach, grounded in 
contractualist moral theorising. The first section sets up 
key issues in the ethics of lockdown, and sketches the 
apparent appeal of addressing these problems in a CBA 
frame. The second section argues that CBA fundamentally 
distorts the normative landscape in two ways: first, in 
principle, it allows very many morally trivial preferences—
say, for a coffee—might outweigh morally weighty life- 
and- death concerns; second, it is insensitive to the core 
moral distinction between victims and vectors of disease. 
The third section sketches our non- consequentialist 
alternative, grounded in Thomas Scanlon’s contractualist 
moral theory. On this account, the ethics of self- defence 
implies a strong default presumption in favour of a 
highly restrictive, universal lockdown policy: we then ask 
whether there are alternatives to such a policy which 
are justifiable to all affected parties, paying particular 
attention to the complaints of those most burdened by 
policy. In the fourth section, we defend our contractualist 
approach against the charge that it is impractical or 
counterintuitive, noting that actual CBAs face similar, or 
worse, challenges.
In September 2020, as part of attempts to control 
the COVID-19 pandemic, students at Manchester 
Metropolitan University were effectively banned 
from leaving their accommodation.1 Plausibly, this 
was not in their interests. Given their age, most 
were at very low risk of morbidity or mortality from 
contracting the virus.2 They had to carry a very 
high burden—significant restrictions on free move-
ment—for the sake of minimal expected pruden-
tial benefit. How might we justify this policy? 
An obvious answer appeals to the risks which the 
students posed to others, typically older members of 
society. But why, then, lock down the young rather 
than the elderly?3 This case exemplifies a more 
general problem: in order to restrict the spread of 
COVID-19, many countries have instituted lock-
down policies which affect different social groups 
very differently. How should we trade off different 
groups’ interests in pandemic response? Most 
responses to this challenge have been framed in 
consequentialist, specifically utilitarian, terms. This 
paper argues for a distinctive, non- consequentialist 
approach to assessing the ethics of lockdown, 
grounded in contractualist moral theory.
Our arguments are important for three reasons. 
First, lockdown policies are the most ethically 
challenging aspect of our response to COVID-19; 
they typically restrict fundamental rights of vast 
numbers of people. Furthermore, given uncertainty 
over whether vaccines are effective at stopping 
transmission and the possibility of further muta-
tions, continued lockdowns may be necessary even 
as vaccination programmes go forward. Therefore, 
we need an account of the ethics of lockdown, and 
the standard approach, framed in consequentialist 
terms of cost- benefit analysis (CBA), is, we argue, 
ethically suspect. Second, analogous cases arise in 
thinking about vaccination: for example, should 
we compel the young to take a relatively undert-
ested vaccine to protect the old? Our proposals help 
clarify the broader terrain of ethical thinking in 
pandemic control. Third, many think it is obvious 
that pandemic response must be conceptualised in 
consequentialist terms.4 This case, then, provides a 
uniquely challenging ground for clarifying the limits 
and scope of non- consequentialist approaches to 
public health ethics.
The first section sketches the CBA approach to 
the ethical challenges of lockdown policies. The 
second section argues against treating CBAs as even 
one input into ethical decision- making, because 
they allow irrelevant considerations to sway policy 
and they obscure the difference between vectors 
and victims. The third section develops an alter-
native contractualist approach, according to which 
the permissibility of lockdown policies turns on 
the complaints of those worst affected by them. 
The fourth section defends this approach against 
concerns that it is unworkable, noting that CBA 
faces similar challenges.
BACKGROUND
Although there is no precise epidemiological defi-
nition of ‘lockdown’, paradigm cases suggest a 
working definition: lockdown policies place signif-
icant, legally enforced restrictions on the freedom 
of movement and assembly of all members of some 
population, with the aim of preventing the spread 
of viral infection.
There is no such thing as ‘lockdown’ per se; 
rather, there are lockdown policies which vary along 
two dimensions. First, in terms of their generality: 
the proportion of the total population they affect. 
For example, lockdown policies can apply region-
ally or nationally to one age group or to all. Second, 
in terms of their restrictiveness: the extent of the 
restrictions they place on individuals’ liberties. 
Closing only non- essential shops is less restrictive 
than closing both non- essential shops and schools.
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According to proponents, lockdowns have significant ‘bene-
fits’ compared with the status quo: they considerably reduce 
immediate morbidity and mortality associated with COVID-19; 
furthermore, in doing this, they protect the healthcare system 
from becoming overwhelmed—an outcome with potentially 
disastrous social consequences both for public health and the 
moral fabric of society more generally.5 However, they also place 
significant restrictions on central human capabilities: to work, to 
spend time with family, to access healthcare, to engage in public 
life, and so on. Plausibly, these restrictions are both bad in them-
selves, and have significant, wide- ranging costs; for example, it 
has been suggested that lockdowns will lead to significant long- 
term economic loss, a rise in mental health problems, premature 
mortality from delayed diagnosis and significant reductions in 
educational attainment, to list but a few examples.6–9 Therefore, 
decisions about lockdown involve difficult judgments about the 
relative value of central human goods. Even worse, the expected 
costs and benefits of lockdown policies are spread unequally. 
Given epidemiological data, it seems that, typically, the direct 
health benefits accrue to older people, to men and to members 
of some ethnic groups.2 Costs, too, are unequally distributed: for 
example, typically, the high social and economic costs of lock-
down disproportionately affect those who are already disadvan-
taged and marginalised. For example, it has been estimated that 
the closure of schools in the UK will have significant, long- term 
effects on income inequality.10 How, then, should we decide 
when and which lockdown restrictions are permissible?
One claim in public discussion has been that the ‘cure should 
not be worse than the disease’, or we should balance the public 
health benefits of lockdown against costs to other aspects of 
health or the economy.6 Economists and philosophers have 
suggested a related, more precise claim: that lockdown measures 
should pass a CBA, such that its aggregate benefits should 
outweigh its aggregate costs.7–9 This approach can be understood 
as reflecting a more general ethical standpoint, most famously 
associated with utilitarian theorising, according to which policy- 
makers should seek to maximise expected aggregate welfare.11 
Such an approach has intuitive appeal; choosing between policy 
options by adding up the costs and benefits for every individual 
seems to show equal concern for the interests of each individual. 
Indeed, such impartiality may seem fundamental to the moral 
outlook.
We can distinguish two ways of using CBA in thinking about 
lockdown. On a ‘strong’ approach, CBA captures all of the 
normative considerations, such that we should choose whichever 
option is ‘best’ according to CBA. On a ‘weak’ approach, CBAs 
serve as one input into decision- making; if a CBA shows that a 
lockdown policy will maximise welfare, this is a strong pro tanto 
consideration in its favour to be balanced against other concerns, 
much as many hold that tools such as cost- effectiveness analysis 
provide one but only one important input into decision- making 
about resource allocation.11 12
There are two reasons to prefer the weak approach in our 
case. First, concerns about distributive justice seem central to 
debates both about COVID-19 in general, which has strikingly 
unequal patterns of morbidity and mortality, and, as noted, to 
lockdown specifically.13 A focus on aggregate outcomes is blind 
to these worries. Strictly, CBAs might be able to take account 
of distributional concerns, for example, through inclusion of 
equity weights.14 However, they seem ill suited to capturing 
worries about structural and relational inequalities—say, stem-
ming from race or class—expressed in the pandemic context, 
which, confusingly, often speak both in favour of taking signif-
icant action against disease to protect the already marginalised, 
and against lockdown, which can widen existing inequalities. 
Second, predictions about the effects of lockdown are highly 
uncertain15; for example, while lockdowns might be necessary 
to avoid health system collapse, this is far from certain5; simi-
larly, while lockdowns exacerbate educational inequality in 
the short term, it is hard to know the long- term effects of such 
unprecedented policies.10 Even proponents of aggregative theo-
rising often accept that, in the face of uncertainty, there might 
be good reasons to prefer maximin over maximising strategies.16 
Hence, using uncertain CBAs to determine policy is theoretically 
problematic.
Therefore, it would be prudential for proponents of CBA to 
claim that their approach captures but one aspect of the ethics of 
lockdown. In the next section, however, we argue that even this 
weak use of CBA is problematic, because it distorts the normative 
landscape in two fundamental ways: CBA risks including norma-
tively irrelevant considerations into debate, and it obscures the 
difference between vectors and victims. Based on these concerns, 
the third section builds a positive, non- consequentialist account 
of the ethics of lockdown.
COSTA COFFEE, CANCER SCREENING AND CBA: TWO 
PROBLEMS FOR CBA
Consider a hypothetical example:
Costa: The Prime Minister’s Office has done a CBA of a lockdown 
policy and concluded that the aggregate ‘benefits’ slightly outweigh 
the ‘costs’. A representative from Costa Coffee turns up at the final 
meeting, she has excellent survey evidence that very many people 
are feeling slight frustration at being unable to obtain their daily 
coffee. She proposes that, were the CBA to take the aggregate 
feelings of irritation into account, then the ‘costs’ of lockdown 
would outweigh the ‘benefits’. Brandishing her Politics, Philosophy 
and Economics degree, she shouts that ignoring her would be a 
‘mistake in moral mathematics’.
Should we listen to the Costa representative? There are three 
reasons to be sceptical of including aggregate annoyance in the 
‘costs’ of lockdown. First, we might be concerned that frustration 
is difficult to measure and commensurate against other goods.17 
Second, we might be concerned that preferences for Costa over 
coronavirus protection are ill informed or malformed.18 Third, 
we might worry that preferences for Costa are simply ethically 
irrelevant (at least, to this decision).
To illustrate and motivate the third claim, consider an 
example from Thomas Scanlon: an engineer gets trapped in the 
machinery broadcasting the World Cup final, such that the only 
way to save her arm is to halt the transmission.19 Stopping the 
broadcast would cause 15 min of frustration for 1 billion viewers. 
An aggregative ethical theory implies that we should not switch 
off the broadcast, because the aggregate costs would outweigh 
the benefits to the individual engineer. Still, Scanlon suggests, 
this is ethically problematic; feelings of frustration seem simply 
irrelevant to our ethical decision- making when significant phys-
ical injury is at stake, regardless of how many people have those 
feelings.
By analogy, even if the Costa Public Relations rep has accu-
rately measured well- formed preferences, those preferences are 
ethically irrelevant to life- and- death decisions. This is not to 
say that, when thinking about life- saving interventions, all non- 
health- related considerations are irrelevant. For example, that 
many children lose out on basic schooling is relevant to thinking 
about lockdown. Frustration at missing your morning coffee, 
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unlike loss of basic schooling, is not morally significant enough 
to enter the conversation when costs like death are on the table.
The ethical relevance objection is not uncontroversial. Some 
hold that decision- making must be guided by considerations of 
aggregate welfare; if enough people are watching, we should 
not turn off the transmitter.20 In the fourth section, we consider 
some of these issues. Still, Scanlon’s concerns are compel-
ling to many. We should, then, be suspicious of using CBA as 
an input into policy decisions; doing so implicitly prejudges a 
controversial ethical debate. There is a response to this worry: 
precisely because of the measurement and malformed preference 
concerns, actual CBAs do not take account of things like aggre-
gate frustration. One might think that our case is a nice philo-
sophical example, but of no practical interest, because no actual 
CBA includes such irrelevant concerns.
In response, we note three things. First, in general, it seems 
odd to say we should use CBA because actual CBAs differ from 
ideal CBAs. Second, we are not at all convinced that actual CBAs 
do exclude all irrelevant factors—for example, insofar as they 
focus on gross economic indicators, which bundle together a 
wide variety of ‘losses’. Likewise, we are not convinced that they 
include all relevant factors—for example, the genuine psycholog-
ical suffering of people unable to see their relatives. Finally, even 
if CBAs do capture all and only relevant concerns, they only do 
so because ‘practical’ decisions are themselves implicitly shaped 
by substantive value judgments; for example, claims about the 
difficulty of measurement typically reflect claims about the value 
of pouring resources into a measurement task, and claims that 
preferences are malformed often reflect judgments about which 
preferences people ought to have. In practice, actual CBAs are 
shaped by implicit relevance judgments—they should be explicit.
Consider a second hypothetical case:
Cancer screening: The National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence concludes that were each woman between 50 and 70 
to go for biennial mammography, the aggregate ‘benefits’ would 
outweigh the aggregate ‘costs’. The only way to ensure that all 
women do attend, however, is to compel them (and the programme 
still passes CBA even if we include the ‘costs’ of compulsion). So, 
the government passes a law making it a legal requirement that all 
women between 50 and 70 attend biennial screening.
This policy decision seems deeply problematic. Even if (rather 
implausibly) it would be in each woman’s interest to go to bien-
nial breast cancer screening, their failure to attend does not 
harm anyone else. Compelling attendance seems problematic, 
CBA or not.
Consider, now, the decision to lock down Manchester Met 
students. Regardless of whether the lockdown was morally 
permitted, it certainly seems more justifiable than compulsory 
mammography. The key difference between the two policies is 
nothing to do, though, with the expected net balance of conse-
quences for the targeted population. Indeed, locking down 
students is clearly not in their prudential interests, whereas 
compulsory mammography might benefit the relevant women. 
The primary reason to lock up the students is not because this 
is good for them, but because of the risks of harm they pose to 
others. And it is because their behaviour threatens harm to others 
that liberty- restricting measures might be appropriate in this 
case, but inappropriate in the screening case.21 It is a common 
thought that risking harm to others makes one liable to have 
their liberties restricted—it is for such a reason that it would be 
morally permissible to restrain someone who was wildly bran-
dishing a knife at passers- by.22 The students, by risking spreading 
coronavirus to others, have made themselves liable to have their 
liberties restricted. By contrast, non- attendees of mammography 
do not threaten others, and, as such, are not liable to have their 
liberties restricted. Infectious disease control measures can and 
should be grounded in the ethics of self- defence.23 24
Importantly, the ethics of self- defence cannot be subsumed 
neatly into an aggregative framework. When you threaten me, 
I am ethically permitted to respond in ways which protect 
me even if those responses are not ‘best’ from an impersonal, 
population- level viewpoint. Imagine a horrible case in which 
a villain is attempting to grievously, but not fatally, harm you. 
Plausibly, if killing the villain was the only way to defend your-
self, it would be permissible to do so, even if, from an impersonal 
standpoint, the ‘costs’ of self- defence are higher than the ‘costs’ 
of not doing so. Using CBA to think through this case would 
mangle the ethical situation. This limitation of CBA is part of 
a broader pattern, linked to its inability to consider structural 
and historical inequality; CBA cannot capture morally important 
facts regarding how costs and benefits have arisen.11
Let us take a step back. We can do a CBA to decide whether to 
initiate mandatory breast cancer screening, and we can do a CBA 
to decide whether to initiate lockdown measures. However, the 
tool risks distorting the normative landscape. In some cases, as 
when it mandates cancer screening, the approach is too strong; 
in others, however, it is too weak, as when it overlooks how 
disease vectors become liable to self- defensive action. This is 
not to say that CBA has no place in public (health) policy. For 
example, perhaps in deciding whether to offer mammography to 
all, we should ask whether the ‘benefits’ outweigh the ‘costs’.25 
You might think something similar is true about lockdown; even 
if CBA cannot justify having lockdown policies in the first place, 
it can help us choose between lockdown policies. However, 
using CBA to choose between lockdown policies misdirects 
our focus on consequences, when the real normative question 
concerns who can impose risk on whom (see the Contracting 
out of lockdown section). Further, even if there is some limited 
role for CBA, numerical reasoning tends to crowd out more 
complex qualitative considerations in policy contexts.26 This 
phenomenon is particularly worrying when the estimates are 
‘spuriously precise’, as in the case of CBA for lockdown (The 
limits to contractualism section)
As an instructive example of the importance of keeping a close 
eye on the normative landscape in lockdown debates, consider 
a recent article by Julian Savulescu and James Cameron arguing 
that lockdown policies should target only the elderly, and not the 
young.3 Interestingly, they explicitly recognise that the ethics of 
lockdown must be grounded in an account of harm to others. Yet, 
they do so by focusing on the ways the elderly’s use of National 
Health Service (NHS) resources might ‘harm’ the young. It seems 
odd to focus on this opportunity cost when there is a far more 
straightforward way in which the young’s behaviour ‘costs’ the 
elderly. A focus on opportunity costs is central to CBA, but risks 
odd conclusions—for example, justifying mandatory screening 
attendance on the grounds that treating late- stage breast cancer 
can be costly—and faces theoretical challenges insofar as it 
assumes an unusual sense of ‘harm’.
More importantly, Savulescu and Cameron motivate their 
conclusion through a ‘no levelling- down principle’. They 
claim that locking down everyone and locking down only 
the elderly would have similar health consequences, and as 
such, the only reason to lock down all would be a concern for 
equality. This would, though, be an instance of ‘levelling down’, 
like responding to the fact that some are blind by poking out 
everyone else’s eyes. One concern here is that they misrepresent 
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the epidemiology.27 A more fundamental concern, however, is 
that the concept of levelling down is ethically inappropriate; 
‘levelling down’ concerns only really make sense if we are 
choosing between social policies in terms of expected distrib-
utive consequences, where all other moral considerations are 
equal. In our case, however, other moral considerations are not 
equal; in this case, some are non- consensually imposing risk on 
others. In such cases, it might be important to ensure responses 
are ‘proportionate’ or use the ‘least restrictive’ option, but such 
deontic concepts cannot neatly be translated into an impersonal, 
consequentialist standpoint.
We do not claim that Savulescu and Cameron have been 
beguiled by CBA. Rather, our concern is that their arguments 
exemplify how easy it is to misrepresent the normative landscape 
of COVID-19 policy choices, by treating them as akin to deciding 
how to distribute scarce resources, rather than as responding to 
webs of risk imposition. CBA is an even worse guide to that land-
scape: it either ignores relevance concerns or makes relevance 
judgments non- transparently, and is blind to the ethically deep 
difference between vectors and victims. Few people think CBA 
tells us the full ethical story—we doubt it tells us any of it.
CONTRACTING OUT OF LOCKDOWN
If not CBA, how ought we assess the large- scale trade- offs 
implicit in lockdown policies? In this section, we propose an 
approach to this question based on contractualist ethical theory.
Thomas Scanlon has proposed a ‘contractualist’ model for 
assessing the permissibility of ethical principles in terms of agents’ 
reasonable complaints against those principles.19 Contractualism 
holds that ‘an action is right only if there is a principle permit-
ting them that no one could reasonably reject’ [19] (p 98). On 
this model, individuals can reasonably reject a principle or policy 
on the basis that it harms their interests. They cannot, however, 
take impersonal considerations—such as abstract concerns about 
equality—into account. Consequently, Scanlon suggests that an 
action is permissible only if it is in accordance with a principle 
where the strongest complaint any party has against acting on 
that principle is weaker than the strongest complaint any other 
party has against acting on an alternative principle.
Consider again the World Cup case. We have a choice between 
two principles: carry on broadcasting or stop broadcasting. 
The engineer has a complaint against the first—that following 
it involves losing her arm—whereas each of the viewers has a 
complaint against the second—that following it causes them 
15 min of frustration. The engineer’s complaint against broad-
casting is stronger than the complaint of any of the viewers 
against stopping—losing an arm is a far weightier harm than 
feeling some frustration. So, we should reject the first principle 
in favour of the second. In this case, contractualism is insensitive 
to aggregative concerns; we should not turn off the broadcast 
regardless of how much aggregate frustration is felt. Unlike CBA, 
contractualism provides a simple and compelling retort to the 
Costa representative.
To develop this approach for the ethics of lockdown it is 
important to clarify two things. First, contractualist justification 
is supposed to work at a generic, rather than individual, level.28 
We are supposed to assess principles in terms of the kinds of 
complaints which kinds of individuals could have against them; 
the kinds of complaints which generic schoolchildren might 
make against school closures, rather than the actual complaints 
of each and every actual schoolchild. Second, and related, 
we will assume that complaints should be indexed to individ-
uals’ ex- ante perspective, rather than to the (expected) ex- post 
perspective.29 30 To explain, consider two cases. In the first, in 
pursuing some socially beneficial end, such as fluoridating the 
water supply, we impose a one- in- ten risk of death on 10 people; 
in the second, pursuing the same end, we impose a one- in- a- 
million risk on a million people. It seems that, even though we 
can expect the same ex- post outcome in both cases, they differ 
ethically.31 To capture this distinction, we suggest that complaints 
should be indexed to individuals’ ex- ante prospects. Rather than 
say that the complaint against each policy is the same—one 
death—we will assume that the strongest complaint against the 
first policy is that it imposes a one- in- ten risk of death, whereas 
the strongest complaint against the second is that it imposes a 
one- in- a- million risk of death.i As well as fitting general intu-
itions, our focus on prospects fits neatly with our understanding 
of the ethics of lockdown in the second section, as grounded in 
legitimate responses to risk imposition.
What makes pandemic control especially ethically complex is 
that each member of society is posing a risk of harm to each 
other member of society by being a potential disease vector. As 
a result, it seems that each and every individual is liable to self- 
defensive response! What would this response look like? Each 
generic individual—the young, the old—poses a significant risk 
of infection, and associated mortality and morbidity, on others. 
The only known effective way to prevent this, currently, is to stop 
these individuals coming into contact with others by restricting 
their movements. While restricting their movements is a signifi-
cant response, it seems proportionate given it is the only way to 
avoid imposition of a mortal risk. In turn, if it is ethically permis-
sible for each person to be restricted in her movements, it is ethi-
cally permissible for all. Taking the perspective of self- defence 
when discussing lockdown policies implies an ethical baseline of 
a highly restrictive universal lockdown. Clearly, however, there 
are all sorts of cases where we impose mortal risks on others, 
but where our actions are permissible; consider, for example, 
driving a car, or even cooking dinner for your friends. How 
might we contract out of lockdown?
Key to thinking about this problem is the fact that lockdown 
measures impose heavy burdens on individuals—for example, 
in terms of their educational opportunities, or their ability to 
work or access healthcare—of the sort which ground reasonable 
complaints. We can, then, imagine representatives of different 
groups proposing alternative, less restrictive or less general poli-
cies. In turn, whether we should prefer those policies turns on 
whether the complaints other generic individuals have against 
those proposed policies are stronger than the complaints 
which the proposers have against the baseline highly restrictive 
universal policy. Consider two examples.
First, consider a universal lockdown policy, where each is 
prohibited from leaving her house. Plausibly, given the effects on 
their education and long- term mental health, and their relatively 
low risk of suffering from coronavirus, this policy is particularly 
bad for schoolchildren2 10—of all social groups, they have the 
strongest complaint. (To return to the second section, note that 
not all of the students’ complaints are relevant: even if most 
individual children feel more strongly about their Pokémon 
card collection than their multiplication tables, a 9- year- old’s 
complaint that he cannot trade his Pokémon cards is not rele-
vant, whereas the complaint that he cannot develop essential 
i This stipulation is controversial. We suggest, though, that the 
differences between an ex- ante and ex- post contractualism are 
lesser than the differences between either and CBA, such that 
what we say helps sketch a plausible alternative to CBA regard-
less of whether the details are correct.
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numeracy is relevant.)ii We can, then, imagine the schoolchildren 
proposing an alternative policy—say, lockdown everyone apart 
from schoolchildren. We then ask whether any other group in 
society has a stronger complaint against this policy than the 
schoolchildren had against the universal policy. Answering this 
question turns on two kinds of inputs: factual inputs concerning 
the likely epidemiological effects of allowing children to attend 
school; and, second, evaluative judgments about whether the 
risk increase associated with children attending school grounds 
a weightier complaint than the children’s complaint against not 
being at school. If the greatest complaint of the other groups 
against schoolchildren returning to school is weaker than the 
schoolchildren’s complaints against total lockdown, then schools 
should reopen.
Second, consider the question of whether the UK govern-
ment should impose ‘local’ lockdowns or a single ‘national’ 
lockdown, as in the ‘Tier’ system which was once imposed and 
which may, at the time of writing, be reintroduced. Again, the 
default assumption is that all should be locked down. Consider, 
now, members of the same demographic group, say students, 
but living in areas, say Manchester and Cambridge, with very 
different prevalence and transmission rates (at least, at the 
time of writing32). Plausibly, both Mancunian and Cantabrigian 
students have roughly similar complaints against lockdown. 
Imagine that both propose a principle which would allow 
students to exit lockdown. The key difference between these 
cases is that, plausibly, the complaints of members of other 
groups in low- prevalence areas such as Cambridge, against 
the students going out, will be weaker than the complaints 
of members of other groups in high- prevalence areas such as 
Manchester. As such, we might justify a more variegated lock-
down policy. Indeed, presumably, in areas of low prevalence, it 
may turn out that members of all groups would object strongly 
to lockdown measures, and, as such, we might justify removing 
measures entirely. We could understand this lack of lockdown 
policy as a case where risk imposition is justified as in the (ex- 
ante) interests of each, much as we understand the permissi-
bility of allowing people to drive cars.33
At this point, it is worth noting an important feature of our 
approach: although contractualism is focused on the complaints 
that generic individuals can make against principles, grounded 
on their own interests, the approach is well suited to tackle the 
kinds of worries about inequalities in risk of disease and inequal-
ities in the effects of lockdown, raised in the first section. In 
focusing our attention on those at the highest risk of ill health, 
our approach automatically places our attention on the most 
vulnerable members of society, and their claims against others. In 
turn, however, nothing in our account suggests that only health- 
related concerns count as legitimate or ‘proper’ in thinking 
about responses to COVID-19. For example, on our account, 
concerns that lockdowns disproportionately affect the education 
of those already suffering socioeconomic disadvantage provide 
strong reasons against that policy. Of course, standard CBA can 
also incorporate concerns about the effects of lockdown poli-
cies on educational achievement, but only by conflating these 
interests with, say, the interests of shareholders in Costa Coffee. 
Our approach has an in- built concern for the interests of the 
most disadvantaged when considering both the arguments for 
and against lockdown.
ii Thanks to Isaac Goodburn John for (inadvertently) suggesting 
this example.
So far, we have considered cases where the complaints of 
some group against some policy clearly outweigh the complaints 
of a second group in favour. What, though, about cases where 
the complaints against some policy and against some alterna-
tive policy seem roughly equivalent? For example, consider the 
worry that, even if they save lives, lockdown measures ‘cost’ 
lives through delaying diagnosis and treatment of cancer34; 
prima facie, it is hard to see how we can think through this 
kind of life- for- life trade- off without some form of aggregative 
reasoning.
These concerns point to a more general problem for contrac-
tualism: that aggregative concerns do sometimes seem ethically 
relevant. This is most obvious when we are comparing harms 
or goods of equal magnitude, such as where we must choose 
between saving one life and saving five. However, something 
similar seems true when we are comparing harms that are not 
equal; take, for example, a decision between saving one person 
from death and 10 others from quadriplegia. Even though the 
one’s complaint against being allowed to die is greater than each 
of the ten’s complaint against not being saved from quadriplegia, 
it seems it might be permissible to save the 10. One option here, 
familiar from much work in applied ethics, is to suggest the need 
for a plurality of principles and approaches, for example, to say 
that, in such cases, there are both valid contractualist and conse-
quentialist perspectives, which must be balanced.24 Such moves 
are appealing, but tricky: as we argued in the second section, 
the problem with CBA is not just that it does not get all of the 
picture, but that it fundamentally distorts the picture. Therefore, 
rather than retreat to pluralism, we will investigate the options 
for a contractualist account of aggregation cases.
There is much debate over whether contractualism can capture 
these concerns.35–38 We will not canvass all these arguments 
here, but simply assume that, as many writers have argued, when 
complaints for and against a principle seem ‘relevant’ to one 
another, we can engage in a form of limited aggregation.37 For 
example, we might allow 10 complaints against quadriplegia to 
outweigh one complaint against death, even though no amount 
of frustration could outweigh one complaint against death. We 
accept that this approach raises both conceptual puzzles—we 
may face sorites problems39—and operationalisation prob-
lems—how should we decide whether complaints are relevant, 
and, if so, how should they be commensurated? We discuss such 
concerns in the fourth section. For now, we note simply that 
the notion of relevance seems important to thinking through the 
ethics of lockdown—as the Costa case illustrates—and that the 
literature contains a well- respected, well- developed alternative 
to CBA which takes this concern seriously.
With this approach in mind, we can model concerns about 
topics such as delayed diagnosis as follows: a generic older 
person has a complaint against loosening lockdown measures—
she will be exposed to a high risk of avoidable morbidity and 
mortality—but a generic potential patient with cancer also has 
a complaint against maintaining lockdown measures—she is 
exposed to a high risk of avoidable cancer- related mortality. In 
this kind of case, who ‘wins’? At this point, we need to engage 
in limited aggregation. If the risks are close enough that the 
complaints against lockdown and against no lockdown are, in 
effect, equal, then we should simply adopt the policy which 
burdens the lesser number. By contrast, if the complaints differ 
in weight, but still seem relevant to each other—for example, a 
10% risk of premature mortality and a 15% risk of premature 
mortality—we may need a more complex aggregation proce-
dure. For example, we might consider the number of people 
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who would have these kinds of complaints, alongside the relative 
weight of each complaint. We would then prefer the policy which 
brought about the smallest number of weighted complaints. For 
example, if no lockdown leaves a million elderly people with a 
strong complaint of (arbitrarily) strength 0.4, but lockdown also 
leaves 500 000 potential patients with cancer with a complaint 
of (arbitrarily) strength 0.7, then we should maintain lockdown 
measures.iii
In the second section, we suggested that actual CBA often 
implicitly reflects ‘relevance’ concerns. Therefore, you might 
worry our ‘limited aggregation’ approach is likely to dovetail 
with actual CBA; we could simply rebrand CBA as contractu-
alism in action. However, it is important to remember that we 
have proposed an ex- ante form of contractualism.29 30 To see 
why this matters, imagine two different possible worries about 
delayed diagnosis; in one case, lockdown prevents a very small 
number of very high- risk people from accessing early diagnosis; 
in the second, lockdown prevents a very large number of low- 
risk people from accessing early diagnosis. It is easy to see how, 
from the viewpoint of CBA, these two cases might appear iden-
tical; in many instances, the same number of lives will be lost.30 
However, if we focus attention instead on individuals’ risk- based 
complaints for and against lockdown, we can distinguish the 
two cases; a form of limited aggregation may be permissible 
in thinking about the first scenario, but inappropriate in the 
second, because the small risks are simply irrelevant compared 
with the risks of COVID-19. Of course, a lot here depends 
on the size of the risks. Our point, however, is that there is an 
important operational difference between our form of contrac-
tualist limited aggregation and CBA. This difference is grounded 
on a more fundamental distinction: our contractualism focuses 
on how policies affect the prospects of the most disadvantaged 
individuals, whereas CBA looks to population- level effects. In 
turn, as the previous section demonstrated, the former, risk- 
based perspective is preferable as an approach to the ethics of 
lockdown, as it better captures why lockdown might be permis-
sible in the first place.
THE LIMITS TO CONTRACTUALISM
In this section, we consider five possible objections to our 
approach to show that our proposals are concrete, realisable and 
plausible. At the end, we develop a methodological claim: even 
if our contractualist model cannot serve as an algorithmic way 
of determining the best policy, something similar is true of actual 
CBA. Compared with contractualism, CBA may appear defini-
tive, but this is an instance of spurious precision. Our real choice 
is between ways of orienting our thinking.
The first objection concerns judgments of relevance. Contrac-
tualism requires us to judge complaints as relevant or irrelevant, 
and assumes that we can assess relative weight for purposes of 
limited aggregation. However, such judgments seem contestable; 
we might think that missing a cappuccino is irrelevant to life and 
death, but others might disagree. How can such judgments be 
justified?
iii Again, this is but one way of cashing out the intuitions behind 
partial, or limited, aggregation. Another form might only let you 
aggregate in cases were the claims are of roughly equal weight, 
such that you should simply choose the principles which mini-
mise the number of complaints. We have presented the version 
we did because it has the benefit of allowing unequal, but still 
highly morally significant claims to be taken into consider-
ation—although by introducing an extra level of complexity.
This is a complex issue with many answers in the literature.37 
Our proposal is that we should think about the correctness of 
relevance judgments—at least in public policy contexts—in 
broadly contractualist terms. This may sound odd, but consider 
a hypothetical example: local residents object to building a wind 
farm because it affects their enjoyment of the landscape. Part of 
a policy- maker’s job is to decide whether such complaints should 
be balanced against the (apparent) benefits of the project at all, 
and, if so, how. These deliberations are prior to a final political 
judgment, but, we suggest, subject to similar norms. The policy- 
maker ought to ask whether the complaints individuals might 
raise against taking these concerns into account—for example, 
they privilege one social group’s aesthetic preferences—are 
weightier than the reasons in favour—for example, the relation-
ship between natural beauty and well- being.iv Our claim that the 
pleasures of frothy coffee are irrelevant to life- and- death issues 
is not a putative report on a moral reality to which we claim 
access, but a prediction that any process for thinking about 
which considerations should enter into policy would render this 
judgment.
This general strategy of deepening contractualism helps 
respond to the second and third objections, stemming from our 
focus on the complaints of individuals viewed as members of 
groups. The second objection concerns interest heterogeneity 
within groups. You might object that, given the huge variation 
between different schoolchildren, it makes little sense to talk of 
‘the’ complaints which schoolchildren can raise; or, given that 
different elderly people might be at very different health risk, 
it makes no sense to talk of ‘the’ complaints of the elderly. The 
third worry concerns the arbitrariness of group designation. We 
have compared the claims of ‘the young’ versus ‘the old’, but 
why not divide the first group into ‘young- and- not- immuno- 
compromised’ versus ‘young- and- immuno- compromised’ and so 
on? Plausibly, decisions about which groups to recognise might 
affect our ethical analysis, and there is no obvious scientific fact 
of the matter about how we must distinguish groups.30
Our response to both claims is simple: policy assessment and 
analysis must progress at the level of the group, rather than the 
individual. Given bureaucratic structures, there may simply be 
no option other than to close all or none of the schools and no 
sensible way to make these decisions other than to think about 
the ‘average’ child. We must recognise groups and think in terms 
of the interests of the average or normal member of these groups. 
One great advantage of contractualism is that it provides us with 
tools for thinking about how to draw up groups; for example, 
given ethical concerns about the long history of racism, there 
might be strong complaints against not categorising the popu-
lation by ethnicity, but far weaker complaints against, say, not 
recognising the claims of all those sharing some genetic muta-
tion. Contractualism can also help us decide how to represent the 
interests of a group; by asking what complaints we might have 
against using a purely subjective account of well- being in policy 
contexts, contractualism can justify why we should represent the 
average child as lacking an interest in swapping Pokémon cards, 
regardless of children’s own preferences.40
iv This may seem simply to push back the problem: how should 
the policy- maker decide that these concerns should be taken into 
account? By thinking about general political norms about how 
citizens should interact and the kinds of claims they may legit-
imately make on one another in political decision- making. Can 
these norms themselves be justified in contractualist terms? That 
is tricky, but we do not have to settle the fundamental questions 
in moral and political theories to show contractualism could 
work.
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The fourth objection concerns not so much the mechanics 
of our approach as its implications. Specifically, the contractu-
alist approach faces a ‘demandingness’ problem. Plausibly, the 
risks which any individual imposes by going out are very, very 
small, but the restrictions she suffers are major: can morality 
really demand that we give up so much when we only impose 
such a small risk? In reply, we concede that there is something 
problematic here: clearly, the risk any particular young person 
imposes on others when, say, she goes to the pub is tiny. It may 
seem unfair, then, to demand that any specific young person 
does not go to the pub. However, while there is a mystery here, 
it is a mystery faced by a wide range of ethical theories. The 
damage one causes to the environment by flying is minimal, but 
the damage caused to the environment by allowing very many 
people to fly is massive. If we want to recognise that there can be 
obligations to reduce one’s carbon footprint, say, then, it seems 
that contractualism must operate on a generic level. Of course, 
this generates demandingness problems, but our approach does 
not face any distinctive problems here; the worry, rather, is with 
the nature of morality.
The fifth worry concerns the conflict framing of the ethics of 
lockdown: why frame all of these debates as conflicts between 
social groups, rather than in terms of social solidarity? In 
response, we are not saying that people should be selfish. It is 
admirable if people voluntarily help others. However, appeals 
to social solidarity and goodwill should be handled carefully in 
the context of lockdown measures. In these cases, we are consid-
ering policies which impose severe legal restrictions, well beyond 
normal, everyday bonds of solidarity. It may be unpleasant to 
recognise that such policies will have winners and losers, but we 
should face up this fact and consider which trade- offs are proper, 
rather than simply assuming away problems.
We have responded to five possible concerns about our 
proposal. Still, we suspect that these concerns are often motivated 
by a more general worry: that, when compared with tools such 
as CBA, contractualism just seems too hand- waving; it requires 
a series of piecemeal comparisons, guided by judgments about 
what is ‘reasonable’ or ‘relevant’, rather than a rigorous, quan-
titative approach producing a single, clean answer. In one sense, 
this criticism is spot- on; we do not have a recipe for reaching 
decisions, simply waiting for some numbers to be plugged in, 
but a more general framework for interpreting, orienting and 
guiding political negotiation and deliberation. In another sense, 
though, the criticism is misguided, because it misrepresents CBA. 
CBA faces analogues of the worries explored in this section: if 
it is to account for intuitions around inequality, it, too, must tell 
us how to divide the population into groups40; it can generate 
huge demands on individuals; and it escapes making ethics 
about conflicts of interests only at the cost of the odd fiction that 
potential Pareto improvements are better for all.11
Still, you might say, at least it gives us some numbers! But 
even this claim is illusory: for all the talk of comparing ‘the 
economy’ and ‘health’ or even ‘health/health’ trade- offs, there 
is no obvious, uncontroversial way of commensurating the 
‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ at stake in thinking through lockdown. We 
cannot, for example, blithely use the NHS’s £30 000/quality- 
adjusted life year rule as a guide to trade- offs generally; there 
are obvious worries about using willingness- to- pay measures to 
think through the ‘costs’ for different social groups, and so on.
Appeals to CBA are not really an algorithmic decision proce-
dure, but more a way of orienting our ethical thinking. What 
proponents of CBA get right is that we should recognise the 
costs—including the opportunity costs—of tackling COVID-19. 
However, our proposed contractualist approach also does the 
same. Beyond that, our approach has the great advantage over 
CBA that it captures relevance concerns and it focuses attention 
on where it should be—those who impose risk and those who are 
most at risk. We agree with proponents of CBA that trade- offs 
matter. But the relevant trade- offs are between the interests of 
different individuals, not between aggregated bundles of goods, 
such as ‘health outcomes’ versus ‘economic outputs’. All we have 
to guide our ethical thinking are general frameworks; our frame-
work is not perfect, but it is better than the alternatives.
CONCLUSION: FROM LOCKDOWN TO VACCINATION
In this paper, we have argued against framing discussions of the 
ethics of lockdown in terms of CBA, and in favour of framing 
those discussions in broadly contractualist terms. What, though, 
does this approach imply for decisions such as that to lock 
down the students at Manchester Met or when schools should 
reopen? We do not claim to have a definitive answer to that sort 
of question. Rather, what we have is a framework for thinking 
about how we should go about answering it: by looking at the 
sorts of complaints which members of different parts of society 
can make for and against policies. In turn, this mirrors how we 
often debate policies, focusing on how they affect the interests of 
members of different groups.
What an ethical perspective on these actual political debates 
adds is the importance of thinking about those who lack powerful 
or well- spoken or pushy representatives. It makes us think about 
what schoolchildren could say if they had power. It also makes 
us think about how members of different ethnic groups might 
respond if they had a political voice.
Lockdown cannot be a permanent policy option; to think 
otherwise is to be confused on the value of health, by treating 
it as a valuable end in itself, rather than as a means to an end. 
Rather, lockdown is part of a strategy which, it is hoped, will 
be ended with vaccination. However, given the huge uncertain-
ties around the efficacy and safety of vaccines, and the threat of 
mutant strains, lockdown will remain a policy option for some 
time. Furthermore, when we think hard about vaccination poli-
cies, we face similar problems; for example, questions about 
whether scarce vaccines should be diverted from the elderly to 
teachers are, in effect, questions about how to balance the inter-
ests of the elderly in protecting their health over the interests 
of the young in receiving an education. Similarly, in campaigns 
against vaccine hesitancy we may implicitly assume that each 
has good reason to get vaccinated, hence overlooking the fact 
that, for some, reasons for vaccination are primarily prudential, 
whereas, for others, they are primarily ethical. As such, mature 
debate over all stages of our response to pandemics needs to 
focus on how to balance interests and the ethics of risk imposi-
tion. We suggest that the framework we have developed in this 
paper is exactly what we need to answer this challenge.
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